Difference between revisions of "Normal Accidents and Root Cause Analysis"
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Normal Accidents book: http://press.princeton.edu/titles/6596.html | Normal Accidents book: http://press.princeton.edu/titles/6596.html | ||
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+ | Systems are categorized by Interactions that are Simple vs Complex, and Tightly Coupled vs Loosely Coupled. | ||
+ | |||
+ | There are a few different versions of the quadrant: http://paei.wdfiles.com/local--files/perrow-charles-normal-accident-theory/PAEI_043_Perrow_Normal_Accident_Theory.gif https://www.flickr.com/photos/metanick/139214026/ http://media.peakprosperity.com/images/3-Perrow-from-Accidents-Normal.png | ||
[[Douglas Squirrel]] talking about root-cause analysis: https://skillsmatter.com/skillscasts/1986-talk-by-squirrel | [[Douglas Squirrel]] talking about root-cause analysis: https://skillsmatter.com/skillscasts/1986-talk-by-squirrel | ||
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+ | Notes on Squirrel's talk: http://www.markhneedham.com/blog/2011/12/10/the-5-whysroot-cause-analysis-douglas-squirrel/ | ||
+ | |||
+ | Notes from John Bradshaw: | ||
+ | |||
+ | Normal accidents: | ||
+ | * 3 Mile Island Accident - Blamed Operators | ||
+ | * Any system can and will fail, and you should plan for it to fail | ||
+ | * 2 Axis graph | ||
+ | ** Complexity -> Simple | ||
+ | ** Loose Coupling -> Tight Coupling | ||
+ | ** Complex & Tightly Coupled = Accident | ||
+ | * Complex system that is Loosely coupled is the CITCON open space set up evening | ||
+ | ** We did not all rush to get food and beer | ||
+ | * E.g had there been a Lion in there, 1 person could have warned rest | ||
+ | * Chance to warn of danger | ||
+ | * Simple but tightly coupled = Dam | ||
+ | ** Accident is water gets through the damn | ||
+ | ** Anything goes wrong with dam e.g. hole, no chance to resolve | ||
+ | ** Simple to reason about, wall of rock with a hole in | ||
+ | ** But is high risk | ||
+ | * In nuclear plant accident, cooling system near radioactive rods | ||
+ | ** Operators can see there was a leak, but no context e.g. they can see the leak is leaking near/into the radioactive rod storage which would lead to an accident | ||
+ | * Book to Read: Normal Accidents by Perrow | ||
+ | * Are micro services tightly coupled and complex? | ||
+ | ** Depends | ||
+ | ** It's down to design and implementation | ||
+ | * Always strive to be in the bottom right corner of the graph, low complexity loosely coupled | ||
+ | * How do people plan for failure? | ||
+ | ** Rob - We go through a certification process to get into Retail | ||
+ | * Each system that could fail is tested, e.g. chaos monkey style someone will manually go take down services | ||
+ | * Internal team will run same tests internally before handing over to external certification team | ||
+ | |||
+ | How do you verify or even test your logging? Instance of a service that logged every time on failure, in a tight loop and filled the disks leading to further failure = Simple Tightly Coupled System | ||
+ | |||
+ | |||
+ | Root Cause Analysis | ||
+ | |||
+ | Scenario: Database deliberately down for maintenance. Instance of a service that logged every time on failure connecting to database, in a tight loop and filled the disks leading to further failure | ||
+ | |||
+ | * Basic principals | ||
+ | ** Everybody who was affected comes to the meeting | ||
+ | * To identity cultural or people problems | ||
+ | * Not allowed to place blame | ||
+ | * Ask/poll everyone what was the problem | ||
+ | ** Customer: | ||
+ | *** No system, was down, can't log on | ||
+ | ** Operations: | ||
+ | *** Confused by phone call | ||
+ | ** Customer Service: | ||
+ | *** Angry calls from customers, did not know what was going on | ||
+ | ** Developer: | ||
+ | *** Database down, no disk space | ||
+ | *** Then ask why: | ||
+ | ** Customer: | ||
+ | ** Operations: | ||
+ | ** Customer Service: | ||
+ | ** Developer: | ||
+ | *** Why: Maintenance on database, database down | ||
+ | *** Why: Analysed log files, saw huge files, checked code, logged with no delay | ||
+ | *** Why: Developer skills lacking | ||
+ | *** Why: No code review/inspection | ||
+ | *** Why: Test for this logging case lacking | ||
+ | *** When QA tested database was running | ||
+ | *** QA too busy to investigate database failures cases | ||
+ | *** No new blood in organisation | ||
+ | *** QA assigned/overbooked to too many projects | ||
+ | *** Action: Maintenance on DB, have redundant database to switch to | ||
+ | *** Action: QA involved earlier | ||
+ | |||
+ | * Actions must be assigned and completed with a timeframe e.g. 1 week | ||
+ | * When you hit that uncomfortable silence half way down, keep pushing | ||
+ | |||
+ | |||
+ | |||
+ | |||
+ | * The root cause of failure is always the culture in an organisation | ||
+ | * It’s always about people e.g. | ||
+ | ** The developer adding no delay to logging | ||
+ | ** Lack of testing | ||
+ | * Create a RCA timeline of failure | ||
+ | ** At what time did system go down | ||
+ | ** At what time did customers complain | ||
+ | ** At what time did developers react | ||
+ | ** At what time was the system back up | ||
+ | ** Etc | ||
+ | * Do as much technical investigation as possible before the RCA meeting | ||
+ | ** Eg this was the problem | ||
+ | ** We had these tests | ||
+ | *** But we didn’t have one for this scenario |
Latest revision as of 03:00, 21 September 2014
Normal Accidents book: http://press.princeton.edu/titles/6596.html
Systems are categorized by Interactions that are Simple vs Complex, and Tightly Coupled vs Loosely Coupled.
There are a few different versions of the quadrant: http://paei.wdfiles.com/local--files/perrow-charles-normal-accident-theory/PAEI_043_Perrow_Normal_Accident_Theory.gif https://www.flickr.com/photos/metanick/139214026/ http://media.peakprosperity.com/images/3-Perrow-from-Accidents-Normal.png
Douglas Squirrel talking about root-cause analysis: https://skillsmatter.com/skillscasts/1986-talk-by-squirrel
Notes on Squirrel's talk: http://www.markhneedham.com/blog/2011/12/10/the-5-whysroot-cause-analysis-douglas-squirrel/
Notes from John Bradshaw:
Normal accidents:
- 3 Mile Island Accident - Blamed Operators
- Any system can and will fail, and you should plan for it to fail
- 2 Axis graph
- Complexity -> Simple
- Loose Coupling -> Tight Coupling
- Complex & Tightly Coupled = Accident
- Complex system that is Loosely coupled is the CITCON open space set up evening
- We did not all rush to get food and beer
- E.g had there been a Lion in there, 1 person could have warned rest
- Chance to warn of danger
- Simple but tightly coupled = Dam
- Accident is water gets through the damn
- Anything goes wrong with dam e.g. hole, no chance to resolve
- Simple to reason about, wall of rock with a hole in
- But is high risk
- In nuclear plant accident, cooling system near radioactive rods
- Operators can see there was a leak, but no context e.g. they can see the leak is leaking near/into the radioactive rod storage which would lead to an accident
- Book to Read: Normal Accidents by Perrow
- Are micro services tightly coupled and complex?
- Depends
- It's down to design and implementation
- Always strive to be in the bottom right corner of the graph, low complexity loosely coupled
- How do people plan for failure?
- Rob - We go through a certification process to get into Retail
- Each system that could fail is tested, e.g. chaos monkey style someone will manually go take down services
- Internal team will run same tests internally before handing over to external certification team
How do you verify or even test your logging? Instance of a service that logged every time on failure, in a tight loop and filled the disks leading to further failure = Simple Tightly Coupled System
Root Cause Analysis
Scenario: Database deliberately down for maintenance. Instance of a service that logged every time on failure connecting to database, in a tight loop and filled the disks leading to further failure
- Basic principals
- Everybody who was affected comes to the meeting
- To identity cultural or people problems
- Not allowed to place blame
- Ask/poll everyone what was the problem
- Customer:
- No system, was down, can't log on
- Operations:
- Confused by phone call
- Customer Service:
- Angry calls from customers, did not know what was going on
- Developer:
- Database down, no disk space
- Then ask why:
- Customer:
- Operations:
- Customer Service:
- Developer:
- Why: Maintenance on database, database down
- Why: Analysed log files, saw huge files, checked code, logged with no delay
- Why: Developer skills lacking
- Why: No code review/inspection
- Why: Test for this logging case lacking
- When QA tested database was running
- QA too busy to investigate database failures cases
- No new blood in organisation
- QA assigned/overbooked to too many projects
- Action: Maintenance on DB, have redundant database to switch to
- Action: QA involved earlier
- Customer:
- Actions must be assigned and completed with a timeframe e.g. 1 week
- When you hit that uncomfortable silence half way down, keep pushing
- The root cause of failure is always the culture in an organisation
- It’s always about people e.g.
- The developer adding no delay to logging
- Lack of testing
- Create a RCA timeline of failure
- At what time did system go down
- At what time did customers complain
- At what time did developers react
- At what time was the system back up
- Etc
- Do as much technical investigation as possible before the RCA meeting
- Eg this was the problem
- We had these tests
- But we didn’t have one for this scenario